In this paper we consider Nash equilibria for the selfish task allocation game proposed in Koutsoupias, Papadimitriou (1999) [26] , where a set of n users with unsplittable tasks of different size try to access m parallel links with different speeds. In this game, a player can use a mixed strategy (where he uses different links with a positive probability); then he is indifferent between the different link choices. This means that the player may well deviate to a different strategy over time. We propose the concept of evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) as a criterion for stable Nash equilibria, i.e. equilibria where no player is likely to deviate from his strategy. An ESS is a steady state that can be reached by a user community via evolutionary processes in which more successful strategies spread over time. The concept has been used widely in biology and economics to analyze the dynamics of strategic interactions.
Introduction
We consider the selfish task allocation game proposed in [26] , where users try to access a set of parallel links. We assume that the users have unsplittable tasks with different sizes (weight) and that the links have different speeds. This scenario gives rise to a strategic interaction between users that combines aspects of both competition, in that users compete for the fastest links, and coordination, in that users want to avoid overloaded links. Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou suggested studying the model in a game-theoretic framework [26] . They compare the cost of the worst case Nash equilibrium with the cost of an optimal solution; this ratio was called price of anarchy. Depending on the cost function that is used to assess the optimal solution, the fraction between Nash equilibria (see [32] ) and optimal solutions can vary greatly. For example, the perfectly known payoffs as an idealization of a Bayesian game in which each player's payoffs are perturbed by random fluctuations. For example, in a selfish task allocation game, the latency of player i's message may be perturbed by a random noise term ε i . Supposing that the payoff perturbations of the players are independent, and with mild assumptions about the distribution of the perturbations (e.g., absolute continuity with Lebesgue measure), Harsanyi shows that the perturbation of the original game has a Bayesian equilibrium in which every player chooses a deterministic or pure strategy given their private information about their payoff. Since the payoffs randomly fluctuate, every such Bayesian equilibrium induces a distribution over pure strategies; the purification theorem states that for almost every matrix game, all mixed equilibria in the game are the limits of Bayesian equilibria in the perturbed game as the perturbations become arbitrarily small.
Evolutionarily stable strategies. One of the most important criteria for distinguishing stable from unstable mixed equilibria is evolutionary stability. The concept of evolutionary stability is fundamental in evolutionary game theory, which has many applications in theoretical biology and economics. The seminal presentation of the concept of an ESS is due to Maynard Smith [30] . Since then, the concept has played a central role in evolutionary biology and has been used in thousands of studies. Economists have also applied the concept to analyze many economic and social interactions, from currency markets to traffic patterns. Kontogiannis and Spirakis provide an introduction to and motivation for evolutionary analysis from a computer science perspective [25, Section 3] . Kearns and Suri examine evolutionary stability in graphical games [24] . Evolutionary stability and Harsanyi's perturbation concept are similar in that both consider arbitrarily small deviations from an equilibrium point. However, in Harsanyi's model, the payoffs for various strategies fluctuate, whereas the mutations considered in an ESS involve only changes in the players' strategies, while the payoff matrix remains fixed. The papers [23, 39] study evolutionary stability in a population interpretation of Harsanyi's perturbed game, where different members of a very large population have different payoff matrices corresponding to the payoff perturbations.
Evolutionary stability and routing/traffic models. In [14] Fischer and Vöcking adopt an evolutionary approach to a related task allocation problem (see [37] for a definition). Sandholm proposes a pricing scheme based on evolutionary stability for minimizing traffic congestion; he notes the potential applicability of his models to computer networks [38, Section 8] . His approach does not apply the concept of evolutionarily stable strategy. The theory of evolution in Bayesian games is developed in [10] , based on the Bayesian best response dynamic rather than ESS. To our knowledge, our combination of congestion game + Bayesian incomplete information + ESS is new in the literature. (Ely and Sandholm remark that ''nearly all work in evolutionary game theory has considered games of complete information'' [10, p.84 ].)
New results
In this paper we study evolutionarily stable equilibria for selfish task allocation in Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou's parallel links model [26] where the users' tasks cannot be split. See [4] for a preliminary version of this paper. We first define a symmetric version of a Bayesian parallel links game where every player is not assigned a task of a fixed size but, instead, is randomly assigned a task drawn from a distribution (Section 2.1). Then we argue that every ESS in this game is a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium, where every player uses the same strategy.
Link group uniqueness.
In Section 3 we show that the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium is unique for link groups. By link group uniqueness we mean the following. Assume that all links with the same speed are grouped together into so-called link groups. Then, in every symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the total probability that tasks of a certain size are sent to a link group is unique. This implies that the only flexibility in a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium is the probability distribution over links from the same link group, not over different link groups. Then we show that in a symmetric equilibrium two links with different speeds cannot both be used by two or more tasks with different weights. In fact, we show an even stronger result: If link is used for task w and for w = w, then at least one of the links will not be optimal for the other link's task.
We also show that tasks with larger weight must be assigned to links with larger speed.
Uniqueness of ESS.
In Section 4 we characterize ESS for the symmetric Bayesian parallel links game. We show that every ESS is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and we show that, to evaluate evolutionary stability, we have to consider only best replies to the current strategy. Then we establish that in an ESS, we not only have link group uniqueness, but also the probability distribution with which links of the same group are chosen by tasks has to be unique. In fact, an ESS requires treating two links with equal speed exactly the same. This result establishes the uniqueness of ESS.
Specialization. We show that in an ESS even two links with the same speed cannot both be used by two or more tasks with different weights. This implies that in an ESS links acquire niches, meaning that there is minimal overlap in the tasks served by different links. We call this specialization in the following. We also show that, unfortunately, the specialization condition is necessary for an ESS, but not sufficient.
Clustering. We introduce a sufficient condition called clustering -roughly, links must form disjoint niches -and show that every clustered Bayesian Nash equilibrium is an ESS. Unfortunately, we also show that there exists a game that does not have a clustered ESS, but it has an unclustered ESS, so clustering is not a necessary condition.
In general, the problem of calculating an ESS is very hard; it is contained in Σ P 2 (second level of the polynomial-time hierarchy) and is both NP-hard and coNP-hard [11] . We expect that our uniqueness results and the structural properties of ESS for our game will help to develop algorithms that compute an ESS. 
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Basic models and concepts
In Section 2.1 introduce Bayesian Parallel Links Games and show some simple observations concerning link load and utilities. In Section 2.2 we introduce population games and define evolutionary stable strategies (ESS).
Bayesian parallel links games
In this section we examine an extension of the original task allocation game called Bayesian parallel links game. Our definition below is a special symmetric case of the definition in [16] . The standard parallel links game is not symmetric since the payoff of a user i depends on the task w(i). We summarise our notation in Table 1 .
In a Bayesian parallel links game, the uncertainty among the players concerns the task size of the opponents. An agent knows the size of her own message, but not the size of the messages being sent by other users. The Bayesian game of [16] models this uncertainty by a distribution that specifies the probability that w is the task of user i. In our symmetric Bayesian task allocation game, this distribution is the same for all agents. A natural interpretation of this assumption is that agents are assigned tasks drawn from a common distribution.
A game is symmetric if (1) all players have the same set of strategy options, and (2) the payoffs only depend on what strategies are chosen and how often they are chosen. The payoffs do not depend on which player is choosing a certain strategy. Our Bayesian version of the game is symmetric, whereas the parallel links game is symmetric for uniform users only.
The formal definition of a symmetric Bayesian task allocation model is as follows. (r, ) is the probability that the user assigns a task with weight w to link . A strategy profile σ 1 , . . . , σ n assigns a strategy σ i ∈ P to each player i. Now fix a task allocation model with strategy profile σ 1 , . . . , σ n . In the following σ i (·|w) is the row of the strategy array of user i that corresponds to weight w. We use σ i ( |w) for the probability that, in strategy σ i ∈ P, user i assigns a task with weight w to link . For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the quantity w(i) is the weight assigned to user i. 
. , w(n).
The concept of a mixed strategy in a symmetric Bayesian task allocation model may be interpreted as follows. Each player chooses a strategy before the game is played. Then tasks w(1), w(2), . . . , w(n) are assigned i.u.r. to users 1 through n according to the distribution µ. Each user learns their own task but not that of the others. Next for each user i we ''execute'' the strategy σ i given task w(i), such that task w(i) is sent to link with probability σ i ( |w(i)). Thus, strategies have a natural interpretation as programs that take as input a task w and output a link for w or a probability distribution over links for w.
Our definition of a mixed strategy is standard in the theory of Bayesian games, but differs from [16] in that we do not define a mixed strategy to be a probability distribution over pure strategies. However, it is easy to see that the two concepts are equivalent: given any probability distribution over pure strategies, there is an equivalent mixed strategy in our sense, and vice versa (cf. [16] 
2. The expected load on link is
where W n denotes the n-fold Cartesian product of W .
The next observation shows that the load function is additive in the sense that the total load on link due to n users is just the sum of the loads due to the individual users. 
Proof. Without loss of generality we assume i = 1.
A symmetric Bayesian task allocation game is a symmetric Bayesian task allocation model where all players have the same utility function u. Additionally, the payoff of each player depends only on what strategies are chosen, and not on which players choose particular strategies. This allows us to drop the index i for the user from time to time and write, for example, (σ ; σ 1 , . . . , σ n−1 ) for strategy σ played against σ 1 , . . . , σ n−1 . Here we assume that σ 1 , . . . , σ n−1 is simply a list of strategies without σ i referring to the strategy of user i. To simplify notation for games in which several players follow the same strategy, we write σ (k) for a σ , . . . , σ with σ repeated k times. If all players in a symmetric game follow the same strategy, then σ (n) is the resulting strategy profile.
Definition 3. A symmetric Bayesian task allocation game
together with a utility function u. We write u(σ ; σ 1 , . . . , σ n−1 ) to denote the payoff of following strategy σ when the other players' strategies are given by σ 1 , . . . , σ n−1 . Then the payoff is defined as
Note that maximizing negative utility function is equivalent to minimizing the cost of a strategy. 
Fig. 1 illustrates this task allocation game and the mixed strategy σ * . In this example, the expected load on each link due to one player following strategy σ * is the same for all links due to the symmetry of the model; it is given by
Let (σ * , σ * ) be the strategy profile in which each player follows strategy σ * . The expected load on link due to two players following strategy σ * is given by Notice that load( |σ * , σ * ) = 2 ·load( |σ * ), which illustrates Observation 2.1. For the expected payoff u(σ * ; σ * ) for a player following strategy σ * against another player also using σ * we have
The mixed strategy σ i is a best reply to σ −i if for all mixed strategies σ i we have
. . , σ n is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if every player i plays a best response strategy against σ −i . The strategy profile σ (n) is a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium if σ is a best reply to σ (n−1) . Hence, a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium for a symmetric Bayesian task allocation game with n players is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (σ (n) ) in which each player follows the same strategy. It follows from Nash's existence proof [32] that a symmetric game, such as a symmetric Bayesian Routing Game, has a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
In the following we say that link is optimal for task w of player i given σ −i iff minimizes the function w/c + load( |σ −i ). In this case we write w ∈ opt( |σ −i ). A mixed strategy σ uses link for task w if σ ( |w) > 0; we write w ∈ support( |σ ).
The next proposition asserts that a best reply σ i to a strategy profile σ −i uses a link for a task only if the link is optimal for the task given σ −i . So a Bayesian Nash equilibrium requires that each player choose an optimal strategy for each task w; a mixed strategy σ i is optimal just in the case it assigns positive probability only to optimal links for a given task w. This is a variant of the standard characterization of Nash equilibrium according to which all pure strategies in the support of an equilibrium strategy are best replies. The proof can be done similar to the proof of the standard Nash characterization and is omitted. 
Example 2.
Consider again the task allocation game and the strategy illustrated in Fig. 1 . Since the speed of each link is the same, and since each link carries the same load given the strategy σ * , it follows that every link is optimal for every task given σ * . Hence the strategy profile (σ * , σ * ) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Population games and evolutionary stability for the parallel links game
We give a brief introduction to population games and evolutionary stability. A more extended introduction from a computer science point of view is provided in [25, Section 3] .
Population equilibria. The standard population game model considers a very large population A of agents [41, 30] . The agents play a symmetric game like our symmetric Bayesian task allocation game. Every agent in the population follows a strategy σ fixed before the game is played. A match is a particular instance of the base game that results when we match n i.u.r. chosen agents together to play the base game. Since strategies occur with a certain frequency in the population, the probability that a task with a given size is assigned to a link can be regarded as fixed. Hence, with a population A we can associate a mixed strategy that we denote by σ A . For example, in the task allocation game of Fig. 1 , suppose that one third of the population places both tasks of size 5 and size 10 on link 1, one third places both tasks on link 2, and one third places both tasks on link 3. The mixed strategy that describes the aggregate behavior of this population is the one illustrated in Fig. 1 Consider now the expected payoff that an agent using strategy σ receives in a match with n − 1 opponents that are randomly selected from a fixed population A. This payoff is the same as the payoff that results from playing strategy σ against n − 1 opponents whose choices are determined by the same distribution, namely the population distribution σ A . In other words, the expected payoff is given by u(σ ; (σ A ) (n−1) ), the payoff of using strategy σ when the other n − 1 players follow mixed strategy σ A . A population is in equilibrium if no agent benefits from changing her strategy unilaterally given the state of the population. Formally, a population A with associated mixed strategy σ A is in equilibrium if every mixed strategy σ that occurs with frequency greater than zero in the population is a best reply to (σ A ) (n−1) . It is easy to see that this is the case if and only if the symmetric strategy profile (σ , σ , . . . , σ ) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. So population equilibria correspond exactly to symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria. While restricting attention to symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria may seem like an artificial restriction for non-population models, in large population models symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria characterize the natural equilibrium concept for a population.
Evolutionarily stable population equilibria. The main idea in evolutionary game theory is Maynard Smith's concept of stability against mutations, which is a criterion for distinguishing stable from unstable population equilibria. Intuitively, a population is evolutionarily stable if a small group of mutants cannot invade the population. In the context of evolutionary analysis, we refer to the base population as the incumbents. Consider an incumbent population A that encounters a group M of mutants.
Then the mixed population is A ∪ M. Suppose that in this mixed population the proportion of mutants is ε. The distribution for the mixed population is the probabilistic mixture (1
We may view a mutation M as successful if the average payoff for invaders in the mixed population is at least as great as the average payoff for incumbents in the mixed population. If a sufficiently small mutation is successful, the population is considered unstable. The expected payoff for a strategy σ in the mixed population A ∪ M is given by
(n−1) ). The next example illustrates the key concepts of population equilibrium and successful mutations in our task allocation game. For readers who are new to the concept of evolutionary stability, we provide a simpler example in the Appendix, using the standard Hawk-Dove game.
Example 3. Consider again the task allocation game of Fig. 1 and the uniform distribution mixed strategy σ * defined by σ * ( |w) = 1/3 for all links ∈ [3] and task sizes w ∈ {5, 10}. A possible mutant population M may be described by the following mixed strategy σ . Suppose that the relative sizes of the current and mutant populations are such that the mixed population A ∪ M is described by the mixed strategy (1%)p + (99%)σ * . Then in the mixed population, the expected payoff for the incumbents is given by
As calculated in the preceding section, u(σ * ; σ * ) = −10. We find that the loads due to σ are as follows:
Then we get
In the mixed population, the expected payoff for the mutants is given by
Since all links have equal latency given the equilibrium strategy σ * , we have
We also find that So all told,
So in the mixed population, the mutants do better on average than the incumbents.
As our Bayesian task allocation game is a symmetric game, we can generalize the standard definition of an ESS [41] for 2-player games to n-player games following [6] . Note that in the following definition ε can depend on n.
Definition 4 (ESS)
. Let G be a symmetric Bayesian task allocation game with n players. A mixed strategy σ * is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) ⇐⇒ there is an ε > 0 such that for all 0 < ε < ε and mixed strategies σ = σ * we have u(σ * ; [εσ
The payoff of every mixed strategy σ in a mixed population with distribution εσ + (1 − ε)σ * and a base game with n players can be computed by summing over the payoffs to σ when faced with k = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1 mutants σ and n − 1 − k incumbents σ * , weighted by the probability of encountering exactly k mutants. We denote the payoff from playing mixed
The probability of encountering exactly k mutants is
Overall, the payoff of using strategy σ in the mixed population can be computed as
Link group uniqueness of symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria
This section investigates the structure of symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria and establishes that symmetric equilibria are uniquely determined up to the distribution of tasks within link groups. Note that, in a large population model, a symmetric equilibrium σ (n) represents an equilibrium state of the population: given that the aggregate allocation of tasks to links corresponds to mixed strategy σ , no single member of the population can improve his payoff by unilaterally changing his strategy. Hence, an ESS can be considered a special case of a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium that satisfies a stability condition (see [6] and Section 4). So an ESS inherits the mathematical properties of symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria. A link group L in a symmetric Bayesian task allocation game G is a maximal set of links with the same speed, that is, c = c for all , ∈ L. Then, for any mixed strategy σ , the probability that σ sends task w to a link in link group L is given
The main result of this section is that in any symmetric Bayesian task allocation game the aggregate distribution over groups of links with the same speed is uniquely determined for symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria. In other words, the probabilities σ L are uniquely determined in a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium; if σ (n) and (σ ) (n) are Bayesian Nash equilibria in a task allocation game B, then for every link group L and every task weight w we have σ (L|w) = σ (L|w). link there is an ''interval'' of ordered task weights w 1 < · · · < w k such that is optimal for all and only these weights. (6) Any pair of links with different speeds are optimal for at most one common task weight. Fig. 2 illustrates this structure.
Lemma 3.1. Let G be a symmetric Bayesian task allocation game with n players and a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ (n)
. Fix any two links and . Proof. We begin with the proof of Part 1.
If c > c , strategy σ uses for w and for w
, then w ≥ w . 2. If c > c , then load( |σ (n) ) > load( |σ (n) ), or load( |σ (n) ) = load( |σ (n) ) = 0. If c = c , then load( |σ (n) ) = load( |σ (n) ). 3. If c > c
Part 1.
We show that if c > c , link is optimal for w given σ , and link is optimal for w given σ , then w ≥ w . Together with Proposition 2.2, the claim follows.
Assume that c > c and σ uses link for w and link for w . Suppose for contradiction that w > w. Since is optimal for w we have w c
Since c > c , it follows that for any x > 0 we have
In particular we may take x = w − w which yields
But then link is not optimal for w given σ (n−1) , which contradicts the hypothesis that σ (n) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Part 2.
If load( |σ (n) ) = 0, the claim follows immediately. Suppose that load( |σ (n) ) > 0; then there is a task w such that σ uses for w. For a contradiction, assume load( |σ (n) ) ≤ load( |σ (n) ). We show that then is not optimal for w. Using Observation 2.1 we get load( |σ (n) ) = n · load( |σ ), and it is sufficient to show (n
showing that is not optimal for w. That contradicts the hypothesis that σ (n) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 
Part 4.
Suppose that it is not the case that w ∈ opt( |σ ). Then there is some link = such that w ∈ opt( |σ ). Note that c = c for otherwise both and are optimal for w . First suppose that c > c . Then, since w ∈ opt( |σ ), w
which contradicts the hypothesis that link is optimal for w . The case in which c < c is symmetric with w instead of w. 
This is equivalent to Since w = w , this implies that c = c , which is a contradiction.
We note that Lemma 3.1 holds for Bayesian Nash equilibria in general, not just symmetric ones. Specifically, let σ be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for a symmetric Bayesian task allocation game, and fix any player i such that σ = (σ i , σ −i ). Then Lemma 3.1 holds if we replace a mixed strategy σ with σ i , and σ (n−1) with σ −i , and σ (n) with (σ i , σ −i ).
We extend our notation for links to link groups L such that c L denotes the speed of all links in group L. We also define load(L|σ
The next theorem is the main result of this section. It states that for a user population in equilibrium (corresponding to a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium), the distribution of tasks to link groups is uniquely determined. Thus the only way in which population equilibria can differ is by how tasks are allocated within a link group. This result is the first key step for establishing the uniqueness of an ESS for a symmetric Bayesian task allocation game.
Theorem 3.2 (Link Group Uniqueness). Let G be a symmetric Bayesian task allocation game with n players and two symmetric
Bayesian Nash equilibria σ (n) and (σ ) (n) . Then we have σ (L|w) = σ (L|w) and load(L|σ (n) ) = load(L|(σ ) (n) ) for all task sizes w and link groups L of B.
Proof. Due to Lemma 3.1 (Parts 1 and 2), for every fixed load distribution there is at most one mixed strategy σ that induces this load distribution over link groups. So it suffices to show load(L|σ (n) ) = load(L|(σ ) (n) 
(1) Due to Lemma 3.1 the task distribution in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium looks as follows. Assume that the link groups are ordered from left to right in non-increasing order of the capacities of their links. Then the tasks are assigned to the links of the link groups in non-increasing order, starting at the leftmost link group. Hence, for c > c the tasks assigned to link are not smaller than the tasks assigned to (Part 1 of Lemma 3.1). Let K be the set of link groups L with c > c for ∈ L and ∈ L . Then there exists a task w such that w is the smallest task that is assigned to any link in K by σ . Let p (p ) be the probability that w is assigned to a task in K by σ (σ ). Then p > p (see Eq. (1) above). Note that p = 0 is the case the tasks assigned to links in K in σ is a proper subset of the tasks assigned to links in K in σ . Now let w ≥ w be the largest job used by a task in K such that σ uses links in L for w . σ uses a group L with c L > c L for some fraction of w (see Lemma 3.1). Note that due to Lemma 3.1 (Part 2) the load of all links in L is the same. The same holds for the link load of L and L . Now pick arbitrary links ∈ L , ∈ L , and ∈ L. Then we get
The first inequality holds since σ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The second strict inequality is due to the choice of L . The third inequality follows because σ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The last inequality holds since c > c and since L is from all link groups with load(L |σ ) < load(L |σ ) the one with the largest speed.
In the task allocation game of Fig. 1 , there is only one link group, since all links have the same capacity 1. So Theorem 3.2 implies that there is only symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in this game, which corresponds to the uniform distribution of tasks to links. The next section begins the investigation of evolutionarily stable equilibria; we begin with a characterization of ESS for a symmetric Bayesian task allocation game that provides a simple necessary and sufficient condition for a deviation from a current population state to be successful.
Characterization of evolutionary stability
Following the usual convention of evolutionary game theory, we use σ * to refer to the mixed strategy associated with the incumbent population. In this section we prove a necessary and sufficient condition for a mixed strategy σ * to be an ESS.
The next proposition shows that for sufficiently small sizes of mutations, only best replies to the incumbent distribution σ * have the potential to do better than the incumbent. The proposition also implies that an ESS corresponds to a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium (Corollary 4.2). Proposition 4.1. Let G be a symmetric Bayesian task allocation game with n players, and let σ * be a mixed strategy. Then there is a threshold ε such that for all ε with 0 < ε < ε, for all mixed strategies σ :
Proof. The proof requires only standard techniques from evolutionary game theory [41] and is omitted. Intuitively, the result holds because we can choose our threshold ε small enough (as a function of B and σ * ) so that any difference in the case in which the mutant and incumbent face 0 mutants outweighs the differences in their payoffs when they face one or more mutants.
Proposition 4.1(1) says that if a mutation σ is sufficiently small and a worse reply to the distribution σ * than σ * itself, then the mutation does worse in the mixed population than the incumbent. Similarly, the second part of the proposition says that if a mutation σ is sufficiently small and a better reply to the distribution σ * than σ * itself, then the mutation does better in the mixed population than the incumbent. Corollary 4.2 shows that an ESS must correspond to a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and that we need only consider best replies to an incumbent strategy to evaluate evolutionary stability. Then we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for a best reply to be a successful mutation. (n−1) ). Proposition 4.1(2) then implies that σ is a successful mutation no matter how low we choose the positive threshold ε.
Corollary 4.2. Let G be a symmetric Bayesian task allocation game with n players
The next Lemma 4.3 provides a necessary and sufficient condition for when a best reply is a successful mutation, which is key for our analysis of evolutionarily stable strategies in a given network game. In the following let
Then the condition of the lemma is as follows: consider an equilibrium strategy σ * and a mutation σ = σ * that is a best reply to σ * . Then σ is successful if and only if
The condition of Lemma 4.3 may be interpreted as follows. For a fixed link , the expression load( |σ * )−load( |σ ) measures the difference between the loads on caused by the incumbent population σ * and caused by the mutant population σ . In the first case, load( |σ ) > load( |σ * ). Then, the mutation increases the load on link . Therefore, in the mutant population, link is slower compared to the link in the incumbent population. Hence, the cost of a strategy σ with respect to link increases as the probability σ ( |W ) increases. In particular, if a) σ * ( |W ) > σ ( |W ), then the mutation does relatively better on link . In this case load( |σ * )−load( |σ ) < 0 and σ 
if the decrease benefits the mutants more than the incumbents, and positive otherwise.
Example 4.
Consider again the task allocation game of Fig. 1 and the uniform distribution mixed strategy σ * defined by σ * ( |w) = 1/3 for all links l ∈ [3] . The task sizes w ∈ {5, 10}, each size is generated with probability 1/2. A possible mutant population M may be described by the following mixed strategy σ . Since given the uniform distribution σ * , all links are optimal for every task, every mutant distribution is a best reply to σ * ; in particular, we found in Section 2.2 that u(σ * ; σ 
= σ (3|W ).
So the differences in the aggregate probabilities are as follows:
The load differences due to the incumbent and mutant strategies are as follows (see Example 3): Now comparing the aggregate usage, we find that there is no difference with respect to link 3 since both strategies use it in the same way. The mutant strategy uses link 1 more often overall than the incumbent (σ * (1|W ) − σ (1|W ) < 0) and places less load on it (load(1|σ * ) − load(1|σ ) > 0). The mutant strategy uses link 2 less often overall than the incumbent (σ * (2|W ) − σ (2|W ) > 0) and places more load on it (load(2|σ
is strictly negative, which according to the following lemma is necessary and sufficient for a successful mutation. We verified in Section 2.2 directly that σ describes a successful mutation at a relative size of 1% compared to the incumbent population. 
1. is negative if and only if for all ε with 0 < ε < 1,
e., if and only if the mutation does better in the mixed population).

is positive if and only if for all ε with
0 < ε < 1, u(σ * ; [εσ + (1 − ε)σ * ] (n−1) ) > u(σ ; [εσ + (1 − ε)σ * ] (n−1) ) (i.
e., if and only if the mutation does worse in the mixed population).
Proof. We begin with two preliminary claims. As discussed in Section 2.2, for deviant strategies that are best replies to the current equilibrium, the success of the mutation depends on how well the mutation and the incumbent strategies do against k = 1, . . . , n − 1 mutants respectively. That is, we have to compare u(σ
. . , n − 1. The next claims helps to compute these differences. Claim 1. Let G be a symmetric task allocation game with n players and mixed strategies σ , σ * , σ . Then for each k with 0 ≤ k < n we have
Proof of claim. By definition
Proof of claim. Using Claim 1 we get
and the claim follows.
Proof of Lemma 4.3 continued. Now we present the proof of Part (1) of Lemma 4.3. The proofs of Part (2) and (3) can be done in the same way. Suppose that
We show by induction on k that whenever 0 ≤ k < n − 1, the difference
(n−1) ) can be computed as the sum of differences over the numbers k of mutants that strategy σ or σ * may encounter, it follows that this difference is negative, which establishes the lemma.
Base case, k = 0. Since both σ * and σ are best replies to (σ * )
Inductive step: Assume the hypothesis for k and consider k + 1 < n. By inductive hypothesis we get
The last equality follows from Claim 2. So overall we have
which completes the inductive step.
The proof of Lemma 4.3 shows that a best reply σ to (σ * ) (n−1) that has a negative sum
is successful in the following strong sense. The best reply yields a better payoff than the incumbent strategy σ * regardless of the size of ε. It will be convenient to say that a mutation σ defeats the incumbent strategy σ * if the sum is negative. Similarly, we say that a mutation σ equals an incumbent σ * if the sum is zero. In this terminology our results so far yield the following characterization of evolutionary stability. The proof directly follows from Proposition 4.1 and Lemma 4.3.
Corollary 4.4. Let G be a symmetric Bayesian task allocation game with n players.
A mixed strategy σ * is an ESS for G ⇐⇒ the strategy profile (σ * ) (n) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and no best reply σ = σ * to (σ * ) (n−1) defeats or equals σ * .
Lemma 3.1 clarified the structure of user populations in equilibrium. The next section applies the criterion from Corollary 4.4 to establish additional properties of populations in an evolutionarily stable equilibrium. In fact, these properties imply that an evolutionarily stable equilibrium is unique when it exists.
Uniqueness and structure of evolutionary stable strategies
We analyze the structure of evolutionary equilibria and show the uniqueness of ESS. For the first point, our focus is on the allocation of tasks to links that are consistent with evolutionary stability. Such results tell us how the structure of the network shapes evolutionary dynamics. They can be helpful for the development of algorithms calculating an ESS for a given system. The next theorem shows that in an evolutionary equilibrium there is minimal overlap in the tasks served by different links, in that two distinct links (even with the same speed) may not be used by tasks with different weights. In fact the result is stronger in that if link is used for task w and for w = w, then at least one of the links must not be optimal for the other link's task. This specialization result can be regarded as a stronger version of Lemma 3.1 (6) , where and can have the Fig. 3 . A typical allocation of tasks to links in an ESS illustrating the necessary condition of Theorem 5.1. Links in the same link group (e.g., with speed 90 in the figure) may be allocated at most one task size (300 in the figure). Links that are the only ones with a given speed may be allocated more than one task size (see the links with speeds 70 and 60 in the figure), but may share at most one task size (260 in the figure) .
Fig. 4.
To illustrate the construction for the proof of Theorem 5.1: Suppose that two links are respectively used by two tasks. Then a mutant distribution can increase the load on one of the two links -2 in the example -while using it less frequently on average, and it can decrease the load on the other link -1 in the example -while using it more frequently on average. same speed. Unfortunately, the specialization condition of the Theorem is necessary but not sufficient, as Observation 5.3 will show. Fig. 3 illustrates the specialization condition.
The idea of the proof of the next theorem is that if two distinct links and are used with a probability > 0 by users with different tasks, it is possible to create a ''better'' mutant distribution. The mutant distribution increases the load on one of the two links, say (by putting the task with the bigger weight with a larger probability onto , and, in turn, by putting the smaller task with smaller probability onto ), but uses the link overall with a smaller probability. Note that this strategy is possible only if we have different task weights.
Example 5. Consider again the task allocation game and the strategy illustrated in Fig. 1 , where the uniform assignment of tasks to links is denoted σ * . As we saw in Section 4, the mutation σ shifts load between links 1 and 2 to increase the load on 2 while decreasing its overall usage, and to decrease the load on 1 while increasing its overall usage. Fig. 4 diagrams this shift.
Theorem 5.1 (Specialization)
. Let G be a symmetric Bayesian task allocation game with mixed strategy σ * . Assume w = w , = with c ≥ c , and suppose the following conditions are fulfilled.
1. w ∈ support( |σ * ) and w ∈ support( |σ * ), 2. w, w ∈ opt( |σ * ), and w, w ∈ opt( |σ * ).
Then there is a mutation σ that defeats σ * , and hence σ * is not evolutionarily stable.
Proof. To show a contradiction suppose that (σ * ) (n) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium and, without loss of generality, assume that w > w . We now want to define a mutant strategy that defeats the original strategy σ * . For that we adjust the 
In the following we assume for the time being that these quantities 
Thus for all links / ∈ { , } we have load( |σ * ) = load( |σ ). For the rest of the links and tasks we define σ as follows.
•
By the hypothesis of the theorem that the links , are optimal for both w and w it follows that σ is a best reply to (σ * )
By Lemma 4.3 σ is a successful mutation, contradicting the hypothesis that σ * is an ESS.
It remains to show the existence of
It is easy to see that the first condition in the definition of d 1 and d 2 gives us
Also, the conditions for 
Since w > w we have w /w < 1. Therefore
Now by the density of rationals there is a rational between any two reals, and so there is a rational a/b such that
Since σ * uses link for w we have σ * ( |w) > 0, and similarly σ 
Proof. To show this result we show the following inequalities.
The last inequality follows from the conditions on
2. Consider the difference in the marginal probabilities on the links. It is easy to see that for all 
3. Similar to (1)
4. Similarly to (2) we have
Theorem 3.2 implies that there is only one symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium for the task allocation game of Fig. 1 , which by the construction of Fig. 4 is not an ESS; so there is no ESS in this task allocation game. More generally, Theorems 3.2 and 5.1 imply that there is no ESS in a task allocation game with more than one link and more than one task size where all links have the same speed.
The next observation gives a counterexample showing that the specialization condition from Theorem 5.1 is necessary but unfortunately not sufficient for an ESS. Proof. Assume three resources 1, 2, 3 with speeds c 1 = 6, c 2 = 4, and c 3 = 2 and two task sizes w = 21 and w = 1. We define µ(21) = 2/3 and µ(1) = 1/3. The strategy σ is defined as follows. Proof. Recall that, in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, two links and with the same speed have always the same load (Lemma 3.1(2)). Part 1. We show for contradiction that if c = c and there is a weight w ∈ W such that σ * ( |w) = σ * ( |w), then there is a mutation σ that defeats σ * . W.l.o.g., suppose that σ * ( |w) > 0. We know that σ * is a best reply to (σ * ) (n−1) . Since c = c and the loads on links and are equal, it follows that for all tasks w, either both and are optimal for w, or both are not optimal for w. We have to consider several cases.
1. σ * uses and for task w but not for any other tasks (i.e., support( |σ * ) = support( |σ * ) = {w}). Then since load( |σ * ) = load( |σ * ) we immediately get σ * ( |w) = σ * ( |w), which is a contradiction. 2. There is a task w = w such that σ * uses link for task w . Then we have two distinct tasks w, w such that σ * uses link for w and link for w . Since for all tasks w, either both and are optimal or both are not optimal, and due to the fact that σ * is a best reply to (σ * ) (n−1) , we have and hence is optimal for w. Similarly, and are optimal for w given (σ * ) (n−1) . So Theorem 5.1 applies, and there is a mutation σ that defeats σ * .
3. σ * ( |w ) = 0 for all w = w. Then σ * must use link for task w, since load( |σ * ) = load( |σ * ) > 0. Since Case 1 does not hold, there is a task w = w such that σ * uses link for w . So again we have link is optimal for w and link is optimal for w given (σ * ) (n−1) , Theorem 5.1 applies, and there is a mutation σ that defeats σ * .
This establishes that σ * ( |w) = σ * ( |w) for all task sizes w. Thus support( |σ * ) = support( |σ * ). Now if σ * uses and for more than one task size, we have two different task sizes both optimal for and , Theorem 5.1 applies, and there is a mutation σ that defeats σ * . Therefore |support( |σ * )| ≤ 1 as required. 5 . A typical allocation of tasks to links in a clustered symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium, which is guaranteed to be an ESS by Theorem 5.5. Links in the same link group (e.g., with speed 90 in the figure) may be allocated at most one task size (300 in the figure) . Links with different speeds may be allocated more than one task size, but then tasks with that size are not allocated anywhere else (e.g., in the figure, the link with speed 60 exclusively serves tasks of size 250 and 255). Now we give a structural condition that is sufficient for an ESS. It can be used to construct an ESS in a wide variety of models where the ESS exists. Theorem 5.1 shows that an ESS requires links to ''specialize'' in tasks where distinct links do not share two distinct tasks. A stronger condition is to require that if a link is optimal for two distinct tasks, then no other link is optimal for either of the tasks. We call such a distribution clustered.
Definition 5.
In an n-player symmetric Bayesian task allocation game G, a symmetric strategy profile σ (n) is clustered if for any two distinct tasks w, w and any link , if is optimal for both w and w given σ n−1 , then no other link is optimal for w or w given σ n−1 . Fig. 5 illustrates clustering. The next theorem establishes that every clustered symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium is an ESS. Intuitively, the reason for this is as follows. Assuming the clustering condition, there are three cases for a given Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ * and a possible mutation σ that is a best reply to σ * . First, a link may be optimal for no task size given σ * . Then neither σ * nor σ use , so this link makes no difference to the relative performance of σ and σ * . Second, a link may be optimal for more than one task size given σ * , say task sizes w, w . Then clustering requires that is the only optimal link for w and w , so both σ * and σ use with probability 1 for w and w , and there is again no difference between them with respect to . Third, a link may be optimal for exact one task w . Then all links optimal for w are optimal for w only. In that case the cluster of these links forms a Bayesian Nash equilibrium on its own with the single task w; it is easily shown that with just one task size to consider, any equilibrium is an ESS since there is no room to shift links from one task size to another.
Theorem 5.5 (Clustering). Every clustered Bayesian Nash equilibrium is an ESS, but not vice versa. More precisely:
1. Let G be a symmetric Bayesian task allocation game. If (σ * ) (n) is a clustered Bayesian Nash equilibrium in G, then σ * is an ESS in G.
There is a symmetric Bayesian task allocation game G that has a non-clustered ESS and no clustered ESS.
Proof. We first prove (1), the sufficiency of the clustering condition.
Part 1.
To establish that a clustered Bayesian Nash equilibrium is an ESS, let σ be any best reply to (σ * ) (n−1) . We show that
thus by Lemma 4.3 σ * is an ESS. Our argument decomposes the sum above into two groups; the first group contains links l that are optimal for exactly one task given (σ * ) (n−1) . The second group contains all links that are optimal for more than one task size and links that are optimal for none task size. The set of links in the first group are denoted by S ⊆ L. For each link ∈ S, we write w for the unique task such that is optimal for w given (σ * ) (n−1) . and support( |σ ) ⊆ {w }. Therefore the differences in load and frequency of use of link depend only on the task weight w , which implies that If a link ∈S is optimal for more than one task size, then clustering requires that is uniquely optimal for these task sizes. That is, for all w ∈ opt( |(σ * ) n−1 ), no other link = is optimal for w given (σ * ) n−1 ). With Proposition 2.2, this implies that for all w ∈ opt( |(σ
The above two cases showed that we can assume
and for all links ∈S and task sizes w we have [load( |σ
Since σ = σ * , there is a link δ and a task w δ such that σ * ( δ |w δ ) = σ ( δ |w δ ).
As the two strategies agree on links optimal for 0 or more than task size (Eq. (3)), we have ∈ S. So Eq. (2) and the fact that both w δ and c δ are strictly positive imply that
Combining Eqs. (2)-(4) yields the desired result:
Part 2. Now we show that there exists a task allocation game G that has a non-clustered ESS. The game G has two links 1 and 2 with c 1 = 10 and c 2 = 2. We have two task sizes 2 and 99, distributed as µ(99) = 1/4 and µ(2) = 3/4. Then the state σ * (1|99) = 1, σ * (2|99) = 0, σ * (1|2) = 1/2, and σ * (2|2) = 1/2 is an ESS. (Mainly because the only optimal link for task size 99 is link 1.) It is not clustered since link 1 is used for both tasks, and both links are used for task size 2. It is also easy to see that there is no clustered Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and, hence, no clustered ESS in this task allocation game. Fig. 6 illustrates this counterexample.
Conclusions and future work
We proposed the notion of an evolutionarily stable strategy as a refinement of Bayesian Nash equilibrium that (1) provides a criterion for separating stable from unstable equilibria, and (2) corresponds to a steady state of evolutionary process in which more successful strategies spread in a user community over time. We investigated the symmetric Bayesian task allocation game, a selfish task allocation game which is a special case of general Bayesian task allocation games. Our results provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which a deviation (mutation) from a Bayesian Nash equilibrium is evolutionarily successful. If the structure of task-link allocations is consistent with evolutionary stability, then links have to ''specialize'' in tasks in that they may serve at most one task in common with another link. Finally, we established the uniqueness of evolutionarily stable strategies. An important open question is to determine the computational complexity of finding evolutionary equilibria in a Bayesian task allocation game. Both our necessary condition (specialization) and our sufficient condition (clustering) for an ESS can be checked in polynomial time for a given candidate ESS. Generating a candidate ESS involves finding a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Research into computing Bayesian Nash equilibria shows that symmetric equilibria are significantly easier to find than Bayesian Nash equilibria in general, and highly optimized local iterative search techniques are available [35, 5] . So we expect that in many symmetric Bayesian task allocation games evolutionary analysis can proceed efficiently by first finding a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and then checking the clustering criterion to establish that the equilibrium is an ESS, or checking the specialization criterion to establish that there is no ESS. The difficult equilibria to analyze are the ones that are specialized but not clustered, because in this case evolutionary stability depends on the exact magnitudes of the parameters of the model, as Observation 5.3 shows.
Another important avenue for future research is to investigate evolutionary dynamics in the symmetric Bayesian task allocation game, for example the replicator dynamics, and to obtain bounds on the speed of convergence to an ESS (cf. [14] ).
Appendix. Evolutionary stability in the Hawk-Dove game
This section introduces the concept of evolutionary stability in a simple 2 × 2 matrix game that is often used to illustrate ESS in biological game theory. A 2-player Hawk-Dove game can be represented with the payoff matrix shown in Table 2 .
The two players have the same strategy set S = {H, D}. By convention, the row player is player 1, column player 2 and the row player's payoff is given first. Thus
One interpretation of this game is that it represents a struggle between two animals over a food source of value 6. Each animal may engage in hawkish or in dovish behavior. A hawk gains all the food against a dove. Two doves share the food equally. Two hawks fight, with a risk of injury to each, leading to an expected payoff of −2. By inspection, the corresponding population distribution assigns frequency (6 + 2)/(10 + 4) = 4/7 to Hawk. The relative size of the mutant group is ε = 4/14. Thus the mixture (1 − ε)π + επ P M assigns 10/14 · 6/10 + 4/14 · 2/4 to Hawk, which is equal to 4/7. Thus, the payoff from choosing H in the mixed population is u(H, 4/7) = −2 · 4/7 + 6 · 3/7 = 10/7, whereas the payoff from choosing D is u(D, 4/7) = 3 · 3/7 = 9/7.
Since u(H, 4/7) > u(D, 4/7), the more probability a mixed strategy assigns to H, the higher payoff it achieves against the distribution 4/7. Now for the original distribution P(H) = 3/5, whereas for the mutants π M (H) = 1/2, so π P (H) > π M (H) and it follows that u(π P , 4/7) > u(π M , 4/7).
So a mutation whose strategy distribution is π M (H) = 1/2 fails if its relative size is below ε = 2/7.
